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CHAPTER 10
TOWARDS A UNIQUE THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL SENTENCING
Jens David Ohlin
I.  INTRODUCTION
International criminal justice is currently faced with a crisis, one born 
from a multitude of ironic and diverse sources. International justice, as 
an institution, exists to bring perpetrators to justice, yet in many instances 
perpetrators found guilty by competent authorities receive sentences 
that one usually associates with garden-variety crimes. When compared 
against sentences handed down in the United States for regular crimes,1 the 
sentences of international criminal tribunals are typically far lower, even 
though the crimes at these tribunals are far greater in both moral depravity 
and legal signifi cance.2 This strikes some observers as problematic, given 
1 For example, the national average sentence for regular murder in the United States is around 
279 months, or 23 years. See J. Gibson, ‘How Much Should Mind MaĴ er? Mens Rea in TheĞ  
and Fraud Sentencing’, (1997) 10 Federal Sentencing Reporter 136 (citing statistics from 1994). 
Over the course of 10 years the sentences have moderated, but only slightly, with the average 
sentence for murder totaling 228.4 months. See U.S. Sentencing Commission, Sourcebook of 
Federal Sentencing Statistics, Fiscal Year 2005 §3, tbl.7 (2006).
2 For example, Naser Orić received a two-year prison sentence for failing to prevent the 
murder of Serb prisoners, under a theory of superior responsibility, although his conviction 
was subsequently quashed. More distressingly, Prcać received a fi ve-year sentence for torture 
and other crimes in connection with the Omarska Camp cases. See Judgement, Prosecutor 
v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 28 February 2005. In reviewing these 
and other cases, one prosecutor at the ICTY referred to the sentences handed down by the 
tribunal in general as ‘inexplicably lenient’. See M.B. Harmon and F. Gaynor, ‘Ordinary 
Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, (2007) 5 JICJ 683, at 683. One might point, in contrast, to 
the large number of defendants at the ICTY who have indeed received substantial sentences. 
See, e.g., Stakić, Jelisić (40), Krstic (35), Brdjanin (30), Kunarac (28), Žigić, Kordić (25), Radić, 
Naletilić, Kovač, Bralo, Dragan Nikolić, Momir Nikolić, D. Tadić (20), Šantić, Češić, Delić (18). 
Also, the sentences at the ICTR have been, in comparison with the ICTY, noticeably longer. 
See, e.g., Akayesu, Gacumbitsi, Kambanda, Kamuhanda, Kayishema, Muhimana, Musema, 
Ndindabahizi, Niyitegeka, Rutaganda, Seromba (life), Kajelĳ eli (45), Ngeze, Semanza (35), 
Barayagwiza (32), Nahimana (30), Ntakirutimana, Ruzindana, Simba (25). However, it 
is nonetheless true that the ICTY has not followed a similar course of handing down life 
sentences and that, as of 2007, only one defendant (Galić) has received a life sentence from 
the ICTY. Furthermore, other sentences at the ICTY have been much shorter: e.g. Obrenović 
(17), Sikirica, Simić, Vasiljević, Zelenović, Landžo (15), Krnojelac (15 aĞ er prosecution 
appealed sentence of 7.5), Bala, Babić (13), Rajić, Josipović, Vuković (12), Plavšić (11), Deronjić, 
Furundžĳ a, Todorović (10), D. Jokić, Blaškić, Mucić (9), Banović, M. Tadić (8), Strugar (7.5), 
M. Jokić, Aleksovski, Kvočka (7), Čerkez, Kos, Zarić (6), Došen, Erdemović, Prcać, Simić 
(5), Hadžihasanović (3.5), Kolundžĳ a (3), Kubura (2). The sentence of Blaškić is particularly 
noteworthy since in that case the Appeals Chamber reduced the Trial Chamber’s sentence
Continued
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the natural intuition that the special gravity of international crimes requires 
greater punishment.3 In one sense this phenomenon may simply be a 
refl ection of the widening gulf between American and European standards 
of punishment,4 at least with regard to the ICTY, where Europeans account 
for half of the judges. While the justice system of the former has increasingly 
bowed to political pressures to increase penalties imposed on convicted 
felons and decrease opportunities for parole, many domestic justice 
systems of the laĴ er have experimented increasingly with progressive 
policies designed to rehabilitate prisoners and return them to society as 
fully functioning members of the community (though European nations 
themselves are not wholly immune from political pressure to increase 
penalties).5 However, the problem with regard to international criminal 
…of 45 years to 9 years aĞ er a successful appeal and de novo sentencing. See Judgement 
Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 29 July 2004, paras. 726-29. To 
understand the true importance of these statistics, it is imperative to understand the basic 
methodology of comparative law. This chapter does not argue that international criminal 
justice has not handed down lengthy sentences in some circumstances. Indeed, the sentences 
quoted above, as well as those handed down by the Special Court for Sierra Leone – Brima 
and Kanu (50), Kamara (45), Kondewa (20) – demand a more subtle thesis. Rather, I wish to 
explore the comparative thesis that sentences in the United States are comparatively longer than 
sentences at the international level, even for crimes such as individual cases of drug dealing, 
carjacking (18 USC §2119), and murder, and include a greater willingness to hand down life 
sentences, and even the death penalty, in more circumstances than in the international arena, 
even in cases with only a single victim (carjacking) or, in the case of drug dealing, arguably 
no ‘victims’ in the traditional sense of the term. Indeed, to explain the situation in the United 
States to a European audience, it is perhaps only necessary to refer to Lockyer v. Andrade, 
538 US 63 (2003), where the US Supreme Court upheld two consecutive sentences of 25 years 
to life for stealing $150 worth of videotapes, under a California ‘three strikes’ statute that 
provides life sentences for even peĴ y theĞ  if the defendant has prior felonies on his record. 
As a comparative maĴ er, it is indisputable that this severity of punishment exists to a far less 
an extent at the international level. Such comparative statements are the scholarly coin with 
which legal comparativists trade. Given the vast number of crimes for which life sentences 
are routinely handed down in the United States, the relatively small number of life sentences 
handed down by the ICTR, as well as the few lengthy sentences handed down by the ICTY, 
cannot cast doubt on this basic conclusion.
3 See, e.g., Harmon and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 
2, at 711 (‘a slap on the wrist of the oﬀ ender is a slap in the face of the victims’).
4 For a general discussion, see the instructive study by J.Q. Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal 
Punishment and the Widening Divide between America and Europe (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). 
5 The issue of political pressure for increased sentencing in the United States is discussed in 
W.J. Stuntz, ‘The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law,’ (2001) 100 Michigan Law Review 505, 
529-30 (discussing the unique dynamics of political pressure facing legislators to increase 
criminal penalties). Stuntz quite astutely notes that ‘pleasing voters might mean producing 
rules the voters want. But this requires that the rules be simple and understandable, the sort 
of thing politicians can use in campaign speeches and advertisements. Sentencing oﬀ ers some 
examples. Mandatory minimum sentences for drug or gun crimes and “three strikes” laws 
are simple rules that voters can comprehend and politicians can use in stump speeches.’ Not 
every European country has experimented with progressive penal policies, and several nations 
including France and Germany fl irted in the 1970s with increased punishment in response 
to terrorism. See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 69-71 (noting that ‘while France and 
Germany have experienced nothing like the American drive toward harsher punishment for 
all classes of oﬀ enders … they have grown harsher only with regard to a shrinking class
Continued
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sentencing extends beyond this well-travelled dichotomy. Since the 
creation of the ICTY and ICTR in 1993 and 1994, judges have been handing 
down sentences for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide, 
with neither a robust system of sentencing procedures nor any coherent 
theoretical vision of why we are sentencing international criminals in the 
fi rst place.6 This chapter aims to remedy this oversight, by aĴ acking the 
second question fi rst, on the assumption that only by fi rst developing a 
coherent theoretical account of international sentencing can practitioners 
then hope to devise a well-craĞ ed system of procedure to achieve these 
goals.
The chapter proceeds in three parts. First, it discusses the growing 
gulf between European and American aĴ itudes about punishment and 
concludes that the dominant European models, while both well-intentioned 
and successful in the domestic context, are less relevant for cases dealing 
with international crimes. Second, the chapter will argue that international 
criminal justice is predicated on retributive notions and that accordingly, its 
sentencing policy must follow suit. Finally, it will conclude by suggesting 
the necessary procedural changes, ranging from theoretical changes in how 
we understand the concept of proportionality to practical suggestions such 
as the creation of an international sentencing commission to guide judges 
in their ad hoc sentencing determinations, as well as the creation (or return) 
…of mostly violent oﬀ enders’) (emphasis in original). The important point here is that European 
countries such as France, Germany, and the Netherlands do not demonstrate harshness with 
regard to mid-level oﬀ enders in the same manner as the United States. Ibid., at 71; see also 
M. Tonry and K. Hatlestad (eds.), Sentencing Reform in Overcrowding Times: A Comparative 
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997) (explaining reduction in prison sentences 
in Germany, Finland, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, and other European countries); 
U.V. Bondeson, Alternatives to Imprisonment: Intentions and Reality (Oxford: Westview Press, 
1994) 20-21 (discussing development of conditional sentence and probation). Furthermore, 
even the limited continental harshness has arguably been dwarfed by the recent US penal 
responses to 9/11, including statutes that impose draconian penalties for providing material 
support to terrorists. See, e.g., 18 USC §2332 (homicide of US nationals); 18 USC § 2332a (use 
of weapons of mass destruction); 18 USC §2332b (acts of terrorism transcending national 
boundaries); 18 USC §2332d (fi nancial transactions with foreign state supporting terrorism); 
18 USC § 2332f (bombing public locations, government facilities, public transportation 
systems, and infrastructure facilities); 18 USC §2339 (harboring or concealing terrorists); 18 
USC § 2339A (material support while intending to commit crimes); 18 USC §2339C (providing 
funds for use in terrorism). See United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1329 n.7 (M.D. 
Fl. 2004) (compiling statutory provisions).
6 Judges in many cases simply cite a litany of standard rationales for punishment, without 
indicating which one is doing the real work of the argument. For example, in Tadić, the 
court indicated that the factor of deterrence ‘must not be accorded undue prominence in the 
overall assessment of the sentences to be imposed on persons convicted by the International 
Tribunal.’ Of course, this raises the question of which factor is the real basis, because the 
Appeals Chamber declined to follow this holding with a positive and complete statement 
of the appropriate rationale for international punishment. See Judgement in Sentencing 
Appeals, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-A & IT-94-1-Abis, A. Ch., ICTY, 26 January 2000, 
para. 48. See also R. Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”: The Evolving “Common 
Law” of Sentencing of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda’, (2007) 5 JICJ 713, at 
716 (describing sentencing at the ICTR as mere ‘aĞ erthought’).
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of separate sentencing phases at international trials. As for methodology, 
this paper assumes a connection between theory and procedure, in the 
sense that the proper procedural mechanics for sentencing may only 
be fi nalised once we have developed a coherent theory underlying the 
punishment of international criminals.7 These are the most paramount 
issues that international criminal justice faces and cannot be swept aside 
simply because the political and diplomatic obstacles to sentencing reform 
are too high.
II.  GULF BETWEEN EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN ATTITUDES 
ABOUT PUNISHMENT
As has been amply explored by comparative legal scholars such as James 
Q. Whitman, aĴ itudes about criminal punishment diﬀ er quite sharply 
between the American and European continents. This disagreement can 
be seen in the theoretical posture toward punishment in the United States, 
including a more prominent place for retributive and expressivist concerns, 
longer prison sentences, harsh treatment while in prison, and capital 
punishment in extreme cases.8 By contrast, most Western European penal 
systems demonstrate a greater concern for rehabilitation, shorter prison 
terms,9 dignifi ed treatment in prison, and a near-total abolition of capital 
punishment, even for extreme crimes.10 I will address each briefl y.
First, consider the diﬀ erences in sentencing theories. Most European penal 
systems are built around a commitment to rehabilitating prisoners and 
returning them to productive society.11 Such systems are oĞ en evaluated 
7 The argument for this methodological assumption is that criminal procedure seeks to 
maximise certain values and goals (e.g. human rights norms, truth-seeking, fairness, etc.), 
and that one chooses the procedure best suited to achieve those goals. One cannot design 
the procedural framework without fi rst laying the theoretical foundation.
8 Again, the proposition here is comparative in nature. Factors above and beyond retributive 
theories contribute to the situation in the United States, including the aforementioned political 
pressure.  See supra note 5 and related text.  
9 See A. Freiberg, ‘What’s It Worth? A Cross-Jurisdictional Comparison of Sentence Severity,’ 
in C. Tata and N. HuĴ on (eds.), Sentencing and Society: International Perspectives (Aldershot: 
Ashgate Publishing, 2002), at 237-8 (review of statistical literature showing that US and 
Russia imprison the most, Japan and Scandinavia the least). Also, Whitman notes at 72 that 
the man who stabbed Monica Seles received probation for his violent crime ‘[f]ollowing 
normal German practice’.
10 There is ample evidence that many European jurisdictions place greater weight on such 
maĴ ers and are moving in a contrary direction to the United States. See, e.g., Whitman, Harsh 
Justice, supra note 4, at 74-5 (discussing the ‘widening divide in Western punishment’ and 
concluding that ‘[t]he result is undoubtedly that the situation in the prisons of Europe has 
goĴ en much beĴ er than the situation in the prisons of America’); C. Pfeiﬀ er, ‘Alternative 
Sanctions in Germany: An Overview of Germany’s Sentencing Practices’, National Criminal 
Justice Reference Service (February 1996).
11 See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 73 (noting that in Germany, ‘individualization, 
oriented toward treatment and resocialization, remains unchallenged orthodox doctrine in the 
practice of punishment, even if academics occasionally raise doubts about it’); K.S. Sharples, 
The Legal Framework of Judicial Sentencing Policy: A Study Based on the Dutch and English Systems 
(Amsterdam, University Press, 1972) 170.
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by the degree to which they lower recidivism rates.12 Prisoners also 
receive incredible access to educational and vocational programs, as well 
as healthcare (including mental health), so that they emerge from their 
sentences in good condition. But this is more than just a commitment to 
humane treatment.13 It also implicates one of the leading moral justifi cations 
for the institution of punishment. If punishment is justifi ed primarily 
because it rehabilitates prisoners and, in so doing, promotes social utility, 
then penal institutions must be organised to maximise these goals.14 
By contrast, American penal institutions are, comparatively speaking, 
increasingly justifi ed by either deterrence or retribution.15 Although a 
fi erce moral and theoretical debate rages between these two schools of 
thought, what unites them is a political commitment, in the US at least, that 
prison sentences should not only be long but, in the paraphrased words 
of Hobbes, produce a life in prison that is ‘nasty, brutish, and short’.16 
For retributivists, prison sentences for severe crimes need to be long to 
capture the moral depravity of these acts adequately, consistent with 
Kantian and deontological inspirations.17 For deterrence theorists, prison 
sentences need to be adequately long to deter other potential criminals 
from engaging in future crimes. This also counsels against making prisons 
comfortable. The very point of establishing such institutions is to paint a 
suﬃ  ciently grave picture so as to incentivise others to comply with the 
12 However, it is important not to overstate the degree of uniformity among Continental or 
European aĴ itudes. Indeed, scholars have advanced retributivist arguments and policies 
in Germany and elsewhere, while a thriving debate about deterrence policies exists in the 
United States. For example, a recent wave of scholarship has considered the deterrent eﬀ ect 
of capital punishment. Compare C.R. Sunstein and A. Vermeule, ‘Is Capital Punishment 
Morally Required? Acts, Omissions, and Life-Life Tradeoﬀ s’, (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review 
703, 711 (fi nding ‘substantial deterrent eﬀ ect’) with J.J. Donohue and J. Wolfers, ‘Uses and 
Abuses of Empirical Evidence in the Death Penalty Debate’, (2005) 58 Stanford Law Review 
791, 794 (‘existing evidence for deterrence is surprisingly fragile’). See also M.L. Radelet and 
R.L. Akers, ‘Deterrence and the Death Penalty: The Views of the Experts’, (1996) 87 Journal 
of Criminal Law & Criminology 1, at 10 (‘wide consensus among America’s top criminologists 
that scholarly research has demonstrated that the death penalty does, and can do, liĴ le to 
reduce rates of criminal violence’).
13 See, e.g., T. Lappi-Seppälä, ‘Sentencing and Punishment in Finland: The Decline of the 
Repressive Ideal’, in M. Tonry and R.S. Frase (eds.), Sentencing and Sanctions in Western 
Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) 92 (‘During the late 1960s, not only did 
fl aws in the treatment ideology become more evident but demands for more adequate and 
less repressive criminal law grew louder’).
14 See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 73.
15 See, e.g., P.L. Griset, Determinate Sentencing: The Promise and the Reality of Retributive Justice 
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1991).
16 Constitutional litigation over prison conditions is limited by the standard set by the Supreme 
Court in Wilson v. Seiter, 501 US 294 (1991), which requires that inmates prove deliberate 
indiﬀ erence on the part of prison oﬃ  cials in order to succeed in an Eighth Amendment claim. 
Consequently, such claims are rarely successful.
17 See Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law, translated by W. Hastie (1887); M.S. Moore, ‘The 
Moral Worth of Retribution’ in F. Schoeman (ed.), Responsibility, Character and the Emotions: 
New Essays in Moral Psychology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) (though noting 
that retributivists need not adhere to the principle of lex talionis). See also M.S. Moore, Placing 
Blame: A General Theory of Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998).
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demands of the law.18 Although conditions might be restricted by basic 
standards of non-brutality as evidenced by human rights law standards, 
they must retain their unpleasant character for the institution to fulfi ll its 
basic consequentialist goal of deterrence.19
Second, there is a wide disparity in the length of prison sentences between 
the United States and Europe.20 In addition to the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines which establish guidelines – once mandatory, now advisory21 – 
for federal crimes, each state has its own sentencing practices. What unites 
all of them, however, is the assumption that violent crimes– rape, murder, 
etc. – deserve lengthy prison terms, including life in prison for the worst 
oﬀ enders. By contrast, most European jurisdictions hand down prison 
sentences that are comparatively shorter.22 To name just one example, a 
Spanish court handed down sentences for 21 out of 28 suspects charged in 
the Madrid train bombings.23 Many of the prison sentences were between 
10 and 15 years – sentences that would shock many US observers as being 
absurdly low considering the severity of the crime in question (a terrorist 
aĴ ack that killed 191 individuals).24 Indeed, some European jurisdictions 
have even abolished, by statute, life sentences.25
18 Although criminal law theory is usually not couched in such economic terms, some 
theorists are pushing it in this direction. See G. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic 
Approach’, (1968) 76 Journal of Political Economy 169. For more recent expressions, see N. 
Kumar Katyal, ‘Conspiracy Theory’, (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 1307, 1315; R.A. Posner, 
‘An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law’, (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 1193 (deriving 
basic criminal prohibitions from the concept of eﬃ  ciency); M. Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: 
Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, (2005) 105 Columbia Law Review 1751 (discussing 
‘whether an economic vantage point and cast of mind might shed some light on improving 
the law’s response to such horrifi c events’). Although I do not share Osiel’s inclination to 
view and analyse atrocity through the lens of economic incentives, Osiel’s contribution is 
nonetheless signifi cant because he recognises the need for a unique theory of punishment 
for international crimes, and correctly notes that criminologists have ignored this question. 
See ibid., at 1755.
19 See Posner, ‘An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law’, supra note 18, at 1208 (noting that 
imprisonment is important as a tool for criminals ‘who cannot be made miserable enough 
by having their liquid wealth, or even their future wealth, confi scated’).
20 See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 56; see also T. Weigend, ‘Sentencing in West 
Germany’, in M. Tonry and F.E. Zimring (eds.), Reform and Punishment: Essays on Criminal 
Sentencing (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1983) 23 (‘Sentencing inequality 
in the United States can mean the diﬀ erence between twenty years in prison and three 
years… Critics of arbitrary sentencing in Germany, by contrast, compare fi Ğ y-day fi nes… 
with thirty-day fi nes’).
21 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
22 See T. Weigend, ‘Sentencing in West Germany’, supra note 20, at 23 (‘The high incident of 
dangerous crime may thus lead to a siege mentality on the part of American legislatures and 
judges which is absent from German legal thinking and practice’).
23 On 18 July 2008, a Spanish court reversed convictions for four of the defendants.
24 The self-proclaimed mastermind of the plot, Rabei Osman Sayed Ahmed, was convicted 
in Italy and sentenced to 10 years in prison. He faced terrorism charges in Spain and was 
acquiĴ ed.
25 For example, the maximum penalty in Norway is 21 years and the maximum penalty in 
Spain is 40 years.
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Third, European and American prisons diﬀ er with regard to the treatment 
that inmates receive while in prison. As already stated above, American 
prisons allow access to vocational and educational programs, but not 
nearly to the same degree as most Western European countries.26 More 
importantly, however, European prisons are more commiĴ ed to recognising 
the dignity of prisoners by treating them with respect.27 American prisoners 
are constantly subjected to humiliating and degraded experiences, whether 
by prison guards or other inmates.28 Such degradations also motivate public 
shaming rituals and punishments, designed to degrade the criminal by 
publicising both his crime and his punishment.29 Sexual oﬀ enders who 
are released from prison have their names and pictures published in 
newspapers or posted on telephone poles.30
Finally, to state the obvious, Americans and Europeans have widely 
diﬀ ering aĴ itudes about the death penalty. While many jurisdictions in 
the United States retain the death penalty, every member of the European 
Union has abolished it.31 At fi rst, the abolitionist movement in Europe 
excluded extreme cases in wartime or emergencies, but now the abolition 
is total, even in cases dealing with mass murder and terrorism.32 Also, 
26 These are generalities. For example, Whitman notes that prison conditions in France are, 
in some cases, deplorable. See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 76.
27 In Europe, the dignity of prisoners is considered to be a requirement of international 
law imposed by the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. However, no analogous legal dialogue exists in the United States, 
in part because the US ratifi cation of the convention came with an express reservation that its 
treaty commitment with regard to criminal punishment would not extend beyond the limits 
imposed by the Eighth Amendment. The issue and its relevance is discussed in Whitman, 
Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 60.
28 See Whitman, Harsh Justice, supra note 4, at 60 (‘Prison conditions are thus in some ways not 
as bad in the United States as one might think. Nevertheless, they certainly are bad, especially 
by contrast with Germany.’). Certainly such conditions also exist in European prisons, and 
homosexual rape is also a problem in both France and Germany. As a comparative proposition, 
though, it is still true that prison conditions in the United States are worse than in Europe, 
and there is less public pressure in the United States than in western European countries to 
improve them. This point is especially important for international criminal justice, since no 
defendants convicted at the ICTY or ICTR are currently serving their sentences in the United 
States, while many are serving sentences in European prisons.
29 Shaming penalties are gaining in popularity in the United States, especially in the area of 
sex crimes.  Also notable is their use for non-violent oﬀ ences, such as failure to pay child 
support.
30 M. Woolhouse, ‘Can bans protect kids from aĴ ack?’, The Boston Globe, 16 July 2006 (describing 
campaign by local residents to force convicted sex oﬀ ender out of neighbourhood by, inter 
alia, posting his picture on telephone poles).
31 For a comprehensive survey, see the leading book on the subject by W.A. Schabas, The 
Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd ed., Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002).
32 The death penalty was restricted by the Second Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty, 15 
December 1989, 1642 UNTS 414 (hereinaĞ er, Second Optional Protocol), which allows 
reservations pursuant to Article 2 that explicitly contemplates reservations for use of the death 
penalty ‘in time of war pursuant to a conviction for a most serious crime of a military
Continued
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the abolition movement in the United States is largely organised around 
constitutional arguments that the practice violates either the Due Process 
Clause33 or the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause,34 while the 
abolition movement in Europe makes reference to evolving standards of 
international law.35 However, American courts are usually hostile, with 
a few notable exceptions, to the idea that evolving standards of human 
rights as embodied in international law can constrain American judicial 
sovereignty in any meaningful way.36
This split has had a huge eﬀ ect on international criminal justice, though 
the split has gone unnoticed by most scholars working in the fi eld.37 
First, international criminal justice is dominated by Europeans, both at 
the institutional level and at the individual level.38 The major institutions 
are Hague-centric or placed in other corners of the world. Indeed, even 
the upcoming trial of Charles Taylor at the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
will be convened in The Hague.39 While the ICTR of course is convened 
…nature commiĴ ed during wartime’. However, the Thirteenth Protocol of the European 
Convention on Human Rights calls for abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances. For 
an analysis of this evolution, compare J.D. Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of 
Genocide’, (2005) 99 American Journal of International Law 747, with W.A. Schabas, ‘War Crimes, 
Crimes Against Humanity and the Death Penalty’, (1997) 60 Albany Law Review 733.
33 See, e.g., United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (SDNY 2002) (opinion by Judge Rakoﬀ  
holding that death penalty violates due process clause), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002).
34 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002) (execution of mentally retarded is cruel and 
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment).
35 See particularly the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European Conviction on 
Human Rights, and the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights.
36 The notable exception is Justice Kennedy, who wrote in Roper v. Simmons, 543 US 551 (2005), 
that ‘[o]ur determination that the death penalty is disproportionate punishment for oﬀ enders 
under 18 fi nds confi rmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only country in 
the world that continues to give oﬃ  cial sanction to the juvenile death penalty.’ However, even 
in Justice Kennedy’s formulation, the standards imposed by international law were merely 
illustrative, but not constraining: ‘This reality does not become controlling, for the task of 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility.’ Ibid., at 575.
37 I took great pains to point out the problems with abolition with regard to crimes against 
genocide, though the issue remains largely unaddressed. See generally Ohlin, ‘Applying the 
Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, supra note 32.
38 While it is true that some prominent US lawyers have served in signifi cant positions at 
the ICTY and ICTR, as a comparative maĴ er their contributions have been eclipsed by their 
European colleagues. Furthermore, the relationship is dialectical, because international 
criminal law currently occupies a comparatively marginal presence in US legal culture, 
compared with most European legal cultures that place great weight on the legal status 
of international criminal law. Indeed, US lawyers in some circles still adhere to the notion 
that neither public international law nor international criminal law is real ‘law’. See, e.g., 
International Law: Norms, Actors, Process (New York: Aspen/Kluwer, 2006) 983 and passim 
(standard US casebook discussing ‘ontological’ question of whether international law is real 
law). Such a view would not be seriously entertained on the law faculty of a leading law 
school in, say, the Netherlands. 
39 Several scholars have discussed the inherent limitations by taking justice out of the hands 
of local oﬃ  cials and placing it within the discretion of the international community. See J.E. 
Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, (1999) 24 Yale Journal of 
International Law 365, at 408.  That being said, the Charles Taylor trial in The Hague
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in Tanzania, the point is simply that the institutions are not based in the 
United States.40 At the individual level, the vast majority of lawyers at the 
ad hoc and permanent tribunals are non-American, a surprising reality 
when one remembers that many of the key legal fi gures at Nuremberg 
– the beginning of ICL– were Americans.41 Furthermore, the number 
of European scholars working in ICL far outnumbers the relatively few 
Americans who are working in the fi eld.42 Of course, one might note that 
the institutions and individuals are all European because the United States 
has recently declined to participate in the project of international criminal 
justice in a meaningful way.43 In addition to the usual concerns about 
sovereignty that infl uenced US policy regarding the ICC, an international 
tribunal was not even considered by the United States or Iraq for Saddam 
Hussein, nor did the US even consider international trials for captured al 
Qaeda terrorists.44
…was necessitated by the fact that there was no adequate domestic judicial system in place 
to conduct such a trial of political importance, and a trial in the region would have risked 
regional disorder. See UN Security Council Resolution 1688 (‘the continued presence of 
former President Taylor in the subregion is an impediment to stability and a threat to the 
peace of Liberia and of Sierra Leone and to international peace and security in the region’). 
In many instances, what is lost by removing the judicial process from the community where 
the atrocities occurred is more than outweighed by the gains from conducting a trial in a 
non-biased and legally sophisticated forum. Nonetheless, scholars need to be more aĴ entive 
to the fact that these transfers to international jurisdiction frequently involve the imposition 
of new sentencing criteria that are widely out of step with local standards.
40 Although this fact may change some day in the future, the lack of an international tribunal 
in the United States is symptomatic of the continuing American scepticism with participation 
in international legal institutions. See S.B. Sewall and C. Kaysen (eds.), The United States 
and the International Criminal Court: National Security and International Law (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & LiĴ lefi eld, 2000).
41 Any list would have to include Robert Jackson (IMT prosecutor), Telford Taylor (prosecutor 
at the US Military Tribunals siĴ ing at Nuremberg), Francis Biddle (IMT judge), and Murray 
Bernays (military judge responsible for conspiracy and criminal organisation strategies). For 
a discussion of the relevant personalities, see T. Taylor, The Anatomy of the Nuremberg Trials: 
A Personal Memoir (New York, Knopf, 1992). Jurists from France and the Soviet Union also 
made signifi cant contributions, though the legal structure of the proceedings (including 
criminalising aggression) can be directly traced to Americans, such as Bernays and Henry 
Stimson, in the War Department. See P. Maguire, Law and War: An American Story (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2001) 94-5.
42 The major journals in the fi eld are all based in Europe, including the Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (edited in Florence, published in Oxford) and the International Criminal 
Law Review (Leiden). No specialised ICL journals currently exist in the United States. Most 
importantly, the number of US scholars working in international criminal law (as opposed 
to human rights law), given the large size of today’s US legal academia, is very small when 
compared with law faculties in, for example, the Netherlands. This may change in the 
future.
43 AĞ er initially signing the Rome Statute under the Clinton administration, the United 
States not only declined to ratify the treaty, but also ‘unsigned’ the treaty in the opening 
days of the Bush Administration. See N. Green, ‘Stonewalling Justice,’ (2004) 26 Harvard 
International Review 34.
44 For a discussion of this issue, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, 
supra note 32, at 749.
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I wish to argue here that the current situation is disastrous for two reasons. 
First, judges at the ad hoc tribunals engage in sentencing decisions with liĴ le 
regard to a coherent vision underlying the incarceration of international 
criminals, leading in turn to inconsistent sentences.45 Furthermore, this 
lack of a coherent vision, one that is truly transnational and transregional, 
has led to a failure to adopt robust criminal procedures for dealing with 
international criminal sentences. Finally, and most importantly, the current 
situation has led to the over-infl uence of domestic standards of sentencing 
at the international tribunals, especially at the ICTY, resulting in sentences 
that may fail to refl ect the moral and legal gravity of the oﬀ ences involved.46 
This argument will be defended in the following sections of this chapter 
by arguing that many of the central rationales that justify sentences at 
the domestic level– primarily consequentialist– do not apply with equal 
force at the international level. International criminal law therefore 
requires a sui generis sentencing rationale. If one accepts this argument, 
the problem must be regarded as essential for achieving ICL’s stated goal 
of ending impunity.47 The solution will be presented in the fi nal section 
of this chapter: comprehensive procedural reform of international criminal 
sentencing. By reforming post-trial sentencing procedures through the 
creation of a sentencing commission, detailed but optional guidelines, 
and a distinct sentencing phase, judges will be encouraged to develop this 
under-theorised area of ICL into a coherent body of law.
III.  S TA N DA R D  V I E W S  O F  P U N I S H M E N T  FA I L  I N 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Having established that international criminal justice lacks a sui generis 
sentencing regime and instead relies on importation of domestic sentencing 
theories only partially relevant for international crimes, we must now 
explore the central thesis of this chapter: that these institutions are 
inappropriate for a system of international criminal justice.
Before proceeding, it should be absolutely clear that this paper does not 
seek to dislodge the privileged place that progressive sentencing theories 
have within some European domestic criminal law systems. I am willing at 
the moment to concede, for the sake of argument, that European models of 
45 See Osiel, ‘The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity’, supra note 
18, at 1821; Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 716; Harmon and 
Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at 683.
46 See Harmon and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at 
683-6. However, Harmon and Gaynor do not explicitly recognise this factor as a source of 
the problem.
47 Impunity is explicitly mentioned in the Rome Statute preamble, in which the State 
Parties express their determination ‘to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these 
crimes’. Although a treaty preamble is not meant to create a legal duty or responsibility, it 
is nonetheless emblematic of the international aĴ itude that functions as a foundation for 
international criminal justice. As far as I am aware, no scholar has explicitly connected the 
failure to create an adequate sentencing regime with the notion of impunity.
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rehabilitation, reeducation and dignifi ed treatment of prisoners are more 
appropriate than competing models, at least within the context of domestic 
criminal law. The argument here is confi ned to the specifi c circumstances 
of international criminal justice. Essentially, although these institutions 
and practices work in the domestic context, they are inappropriate for 
crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, and it is 
especially unfortunate that domestic penal practices have been imported 
without consideration of their suitability to international criminal justice. 
I would submit that international criminal law would do beĴ er to look to 
the standard institutions of jus in bello – the law of war – than domestic 
criminal law.48
Consider fi rst our commitment to reeducation and rehabilitation. In 
the domestic context, it may make sense to oﬀ er services for the prison 
population that needs to be reintroduced into society. The idea here is to 
reform the criminal – both his habits and his mindset – and to rid him of 
criminal tendencies.49 Many of these notions have now been enshrined 
both in penal policy as well as basic human rights standards.50 In the 
international context, however, one must ask whether it makes sense to 
aĴ empt rehabilitation in cases of genocide and crimes against humanity.51 
For individuals who believe that members of an ethnic group are ‘sub-
48 The appropriate judicial precedent for the law of war is the system of military justice that 
dominates in most Western democracies. Far from being judicially naïve, such military 
institutions have a reputation for demonstrating remarkable fi delity to basic principles of 
criminal law and procedural protections, even if punishments are occasionally harsh. For an 
example, see the US Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 USC §§ 801 et seq. It is important 
to distinguish between the harsh punishments meted down by courts martial, on the one 
hand, and the kind of rough baĴ lefi eld justice advocated by Churchill, who suggested quick 
baĴ lefi eld trials for members of the Nazi General Staﬀ , followed by summary execution. The 
appropriate balance is the one achieved at Nuremberg – severe punishments aĞ er rigorous 
trials conducted according to the rule of law. This sentiment is embodied in the famous phrase 
from Justice Jackson: ‘That four great nations, fl ushed with victory and stung with injury 
stay the hand of vengeance and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment 
of the law is one of the most signifi cant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.’ For a 
discussion, see generally G. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity: The Struggle for Global Justice 
(New York: The New Press, 2003).
49 This idea implicates a medical model of punishment, one amply explored in Michel 
Foucault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Vintage, 1978).
50 The most telling example of applying basic principles of human rights to the penal process 
is the Soering case that held that the so-called death row phenomenon – languishing in prison 
while awaiting execution as the appeals process winds down – is an inhuman and degrading 
punishment in violation of the European Convention on Human Rights. See Judgement, 
Soering v. UK, Application no. 14038/88, 7 July 1989, para. 105.
51 Part of the importation may be explained by the nexus between human rights law and 
international criminal law. The former concentrates on rehabilitation as an appropriate goal 
for penal sanctions. See, e.g., Article 10 (3) of the ICCPR: ‘The penitentiary system shall 
comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of which shall be their reformation and 
social rehabilitation.’ For an example, see Judgement, Prosecutor v. Hadžihasanović, Case No. 
IT-01-47-T, T. Ch., T. Ch. II, ICTY, 15 March 2006, para. 2080 (‘The Chamber also fi nds that 
the Accused Hadžihasanović has a character which can be rehabilitated and that he thus 
merits a reduced sentence’).
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human’ and ought to be ‘destroyed in whole or in part,’ through eradication, 
mass murder and rape, or expulsion from a territory, such mindsets are not 
susceptible to reform through programs of ‘reeducation.’52 This problem is 
exacerbated by the fact that international criminal justice focuses, for the 
most part, on major organisers of genocide and crimes against humanity, as 
opposed to street level participants.53 Could Hitler, Himmler or Eichmann 
have been reformed of their genocidal commitments while in prison to such 
an extent that they could be rehabilitated and returned to productive use in 
society?54 To the contrary, our experience with genocidal Nazi war criminals 
suggests that those who serve prison sentences for genocide spend the rest 
of their lives as apologists for the genocidal regimes they served.55
Second, the policy goal of deterrence is equally problematic in cases of 
international criminal justice.56 While criminals in the domestic context 
52 For examples, one need only consult the trial of Milošević, who appeared uĴ erly unfazed 
by his time in incarceration and used his trial to further publicise his Weltanschauung. For 
an innovative description of the trial, see M. Steinitz, ‘The Milosevic Trial – Live! An Iconical 
Analysis of International Law’s Claim of Legitimate Authority,’ (2005) 3 JICJ 103-23 (discussing 
the symbolism of the interpersonal dynamics of the trial). 
53 This argument is not based on the idea that all such criminals are inherently similar. Rather, 
the argument is based on the inherent similarity of genocide and the other core international 
crimes, as compared with domestic crimes. It must be conceded that lower-level defendants 
who engage in war crimes because they are simply following orders or fear for their lives, 
e.g. Erdemović, may be legitimately reeducated and reintroduced to society. See also C.R. 
Browning, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police BaĴ alion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland (New 
York: Harper, 1992). But it is unclear if the same holds true for organisers of a joint criminal 
enterprise to commit genocide, whose criminal actions are not motivated by a desire to follow 
military orders but rather a desire to achieve a genocidal outcome based on the belief, as 
a maĴ er of science, that another ethnic group is inherently sub-human. Such aĴ itudes are 
usually so closely held that they are not subject to revision. Cf. E. Staub, The Roots of Evil: The 
Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992) 
76 (discussing the fanatic as perpetrator).
54 See M. Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass 
Atrocity’, (2005) 99 Northwestern University Law Review 539, at 590 (deterrence based on 
unproven assumption of perpetrator rationality in the chaos of massive violence). Drumbl 
correctly argues that domestic criminal law theories regarding sentencing are irrelevant for 
international criminal law.
55 Indeed, Hitler’s time in prison aĞ er the Beer Hall Putsch did not deter him from engaging 
in future acts of violence and historical evidence suggests that it had the reverse eﬀ ect: it 
radicalised him, inspired him to write Mein Kampf, and laid the seeds for his eventual rise 
to power. However, not every case study is as black and white as this. Some might wish to 
point to the story of Erdemović, who demonstrated apparently sincere remorse aĞ er his 
appearance before the ICTY on charges of crimes against humanity for shooting civilians 
in a massacre. It is important to note, however, that Erdemović’s remorse began before his 
trial – he commiĴ ed the killings only aĞ er his life and that of his family was threatened 
by his commanding oﬃ  cer – and that his remorse was not generated by his time in prison 
and was already in evidence before his trial was even concluded and certainly before his 
sentence began. For a discussion of the Erdemović case, see A. Fichtelberg, ‘Liberal Values in 
International Criminal Law: A Critique of Erdemović,’ (2008) 6 JICJ 3-19.
56 Ralph Henham asserts that current international criminal sentencing practice is built 
primarily around retributivism. See his ‘Developing Contextualized Rationales for Sentencing 
in International Criminal Trials: A Plea for Empirical Research’, (2007) 5 JICJ 757-78, at
Continued
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may or may not be motivated by fear of punishment – the empirical 
point is still hotly debated57 – war criminals are even less susceptible to 
the usual inducements.58 Those who kill and rape civilians are motivated 
by a variety of factors – genocidal hatred, war-induced rage, etc. – and 
…757. However, it is unclear what the basis is for this sweeping assumption. Although 
Henham cites Aleksovski, the Appeals Chamber in that case responded to a Prosecutor’s 
oﬃ  ce submission arguing that the central aim of international sentencing was to deter future 
crimes. Instead of rejecting this assertion, the ICTY Appeals Chamber simply indicated 
that retribution was an ‘equally important factor’ and cited the need to make ‘plain the 
condemnation of the international community of the behavior in question‘. See Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 24 March 2000, para. 185 
(increasing Trial Chamber sentence of two and a half years to seven years minus time already 
served). However, the subsequent sentences of the ICTY Appeal Chamber, see supra note 2 
and related text, call into question whether these sentences are anything more than empty 
rhetoric. Furthermore, other trial chambers have specifi cally rejected retributivism as a basis 
for international sentencing. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14, T. Ch. I, 
ICTY, 3 March 2000, para. 761, where the Trial Chamber specifi cally prioritised deterrence 
as the leading basis for sentencing. This line of reasoning also follows Judgement, Prosecutor 
v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 16 November 1998, para. 1234, noting that 
deterrence is ‘probably the most important factor in the assessment of appropriate sentences 
for violations of international humanitarian law.’ The Chamber even argued that ‘the accused 
should be suﬃ  ciently deterred by appropriate sentence from ever contemplating taking part 
in such crimes again, persons in similar situations in the future should similarly be deterred 
from resorting to such crimes.’ It seems implausible to think that future war criminals will 
be deterred by sentences from an international court, given the nature of these confl icts and 
the fact that war criminals are usually motivated by extreme versions of genocidal hatred, 
racial animus, or war-like aggression. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber in Čelebići rejected 
retributivism in the strongest possible language, noting that ‘[t]he theory of retribution, which 
is an inheritance of the primitive theory of revenge, urges the Trial Chamber to retaliate to 
appease the victim’ and concluding that ‘[r]etributive punishment by itself does not bring 
justice.’ See ibid., at para. 1231. The Trial Chamber argued that retributivism by itself was 
inconsistent with the reconciliatory aspirations of the Security Council to restore peace and 
security in the region, and then spoke positively about protection of society, rehabilitation, 
and deterrence. Other trial chambers have treated retributivism as just one among many 
competing rationales. See Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, T. 
Ch., ICTY, 14 July 1997, para. 61 (‘Further, while the purpose of criminal law sanctions include 
such aims as just punishment, deterrence, incapacitation of the dangerous and rehabilitation, 
the Trial Chamber accepts that the “modern philosophy of penology [is] that the punishment 
should fi t the oﬀ ender and not merely the crime.”‘); Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., 
Case No. IT-96-21, A. Ch., ICTY, 20 February 2001, para. 806 (concluding that deterrent and 
retributive goals should be more important than rehabilitation and specifi cally rejecting 
Article 10 (3) ICCPR and Article 5 (6) of the American Convention on Human Rights.). For 
a discussion, see also W.A. Schabas, ‘Penalties,’ in A. Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court: A Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) 1517-
18 (noting also that the Appeals Chamber aĴ ached some weight to retributive concerns in 
Aleksovski and Čelebići).
57 The issue is most oĞ en researched within the context of the death penalty. See Sunstein 
and Vermeule, ‘Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?’, supra note 12, at 711; Donohue 
and Wolfers, ‘Is Capital Punishment Morally Required?’, supra note 12, at 794; Radelet and 
Akers, ‘Deterrence and the Death Penalty’, supra note 12, at 10. For a discussion of the issue 
within criminal law generally, see P.H. Robinson and J.M. Darley, ‘The Role of Deterrence 
in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best’, (2003) 91 
Georgetown Law Journal 949, at 953. 
58 The problems associated with deterrence are explored by David Wippman in his article 
‘Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of International Justice’, (1999) 23 Fordham International 
Law Journal 473.
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most of these are not the types of motivations that can be altered by the 
knowledge that, possibly, just possibly, one might face criminal liability at 
an ad hoc or permanent international tribunal.59 Indeed, war criminals are 
uniquely willing to engage in their conduct regardless of the personal cost, 
because, as combatants, they face death every day.60 Against the backdrop 
of a violent death in a military confl ict, the possibility of a prison term is 
nothing signifi cant.61 (Those who occupy command positions in either 
the military or civilian leadership – who are removed from daily military 
danger – are oĞ en fuelled by feelings of megalomania and again are 
sometimes insensitive to rational inducements.) Also, prisoners convicted 
at the ICTY are oĞ en housed in prisons in countries such as Norway and 
Sweden, where prison conditions are excellent, including televisions and 
access to places of religious worship for engaging in quiet refl ection.62 
If anything, such conditions would be a welcome change from military 
service – not something to be feared.
As a fi nal point, consider also an expressivist theory of punishment.63 It 
is possible that international criminal punishment might be legitimately 
justifi ed on these grounds.64 Perhaps the whole point of such sentences 
is to express society’s condemnation of such horrendous activity. In this 
59 Indeed, even though Erdemović and those in analogous situations (e.g. duress) were not 
motivated by genocidal hatred, they too would not be aﬀ ected by indirect or direct deterrence, 
since the duress applied against them functioned to outweigh all other competing factors.
60 Granted, not all war criminals are members of the military or paramilitary. Some defendants 
are politicians (e.g. Stakić, Milosević, Karadžić, etc.), while others are members of the private 
sector (Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze were media executives). Even within this civilian 
group, though, many (such as Stakić) are personally engaged in the military campaign in 
some fashion. See, e.g. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Stakić, Case No. IT-97-24-T, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 
31 July 2003, para. 368 (noting that cooperation with military authorities was so close that 
Stakić eventually wore a military uniform and carried a weapon, even though he was a 
civilian politician).
61 Payam Akhavan argues that a deterrence model for international criminal justice can work 
by instilling respect for the rule of law, though it is unclear how this happens given that 
genocidal criminals act outside the boundaries of civilised conduct. See his ‘Justice in the 
Hague, Peace in the Former Yugoslavia?’, (1999) 20 Human Rights Quarterly 737, at 744. Noted 
jurist Theodor Meron also apparently believes that war criminals can be deterred through 
expansion of war crimes prosecutions. See T. Meron, ‘From Nuremberg to the Hague,’ (1995) 
149 Military Law Review 107.
62 Defendants convicted at the ICTR – apart from those that still remain in the UN Detention 
Facility in Arusha (Tanzania) – are currently housed in prisons in Mali and Italy which 
replicate the standard prison conditions for domestic crimes in these countries. Benin, 
Swaziland, France, Sweden and, more recently, Rwanda, have also signed a cooperation 
agreement with the ICTR to house convicted defendants, but have not yet received any.
63 On the relationship between retributivism and expressivism, see H.L.A. Hart, Punishment 
and Responsibility (New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1968) 234-35. See also 
J. Feinberg, ‘The Expressive Function of Punishment,’ in J. Feinberg, Doing and Deserving: 
Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970). Cf. A. von 
Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) 9.
64 See Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and Individual Punishment’, supra note 54, at 592 (noting 
that international criminal law expresses the primary of international law itself).
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case, ‘society’ is the international community.65 However, if this is the 
case, then clearly we want to express that genocide and crimes against 
humanity are far greater crimes than single cases of murder. They are moral 
catastrophes deserving of the highest condemnation we can muster. If that 
is the underlying background of the sentencing philosophy of international 
criminal justice,66 the sentencing schemes should be much higher than 
those available in the domestic context.67 Unfortunately, however, cases 
of complicity in crimes against humanity, genocide, and war crimes, have 
oĞ en yielded sentences (at least at the ICTY) that may not adequately 
express the world community’s outrage over the moral indignities that 
the victims suﬀ ered.68
This is especially problematic given that the central stated goal of 
international criminal justice, as expressed in the Rome Statute, is to end 
impunity for international crimes. However, when someone is complicit 
in genocidal acts, of conspiring to murder or participating in the murder 
of thousands of individuals, and then spends only 10 or 20 years in a 
comfortable prison watching cable television and engaging in pleasant 
recreational activities, then we must ask ourselves some serious questions 
about whether, in some sense, genocidal criminals are geĴ ing away with 
murder.69 This is precisely the danger when sentences are too short and 
served in comfortable surroundings.
Given that none of these models are appropriate for international criminal 
justice, it is striking that producing a general theory of international 
sentencing is not higher on the agenda for international judges and 
scholars.70 The only remaining model – retributivism – is the least popular, 
65 This may be especially important in cases of genocide, where the international law trial both 
establishes a historical record and also expresses the international community’s judgement 
that the facts constitute genocide.  See ibid., at 593. See also Sentencing Judgement, Prosecutor 
v. Sikirica, Case No. IT-95-8-S, T. Ch., ICTY, 13 November 2001, para. 149 (discussing the 
truth-fi nding function as a fundamental objective of international tribunals).
66 See R.D. Sloane, ‘The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the 
National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law,’ (2007) 43 Stanford 
Journal of International Law 39.
67 See, e.g., von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions, supra note 63, at 15.
68 See Harmon and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at 
683-6 (noting inadequacy of ICTY punishments); see also Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and 
Individual Punishment’, supra note 54, at 565 (discussing sentences generally for international 
and national crimes).
69 One well-publicised case involves the sentence of Biljana Plavšić, the Bosnian Serb president, 
who served her prison sentence in a comfortable Swedish prison complete with recreational 
activities, including horseback riding, a massage room, and saunas. See Sentencing Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Plavšić, Case No. IT-00-39, T. Ch., ICTY, 27 February 2003 (eleven-year sentence 
for crimes against humanity). Prosecutors dropped a genocide charge against Plavšić aĞ er 
she agreed to plead guilty to persecution as a crime against humanity. For a discussion of 
the case and the sentencing controversy, see N.A. Combs, ‘International Decisions’, (2003) 97 
American Journal of International Law 929, at 935; P. McLoughlin, ‘Serb War Criminal Plavsic 
Goes to Swedish Jail’, Reuters News Service, 27 June 2003.
70 A few scholars have adequately noted the urgency of the problem, though it is unclear
Continued
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both in the United States and in Europe.71 But as we shall see in the 
following section, it is retributivism that most closely tracks the policy 
goal of international criminal justice and the unique factors present in the 
law of war. Furthermore, as will be demonstrated in the fi nal section, the 
relative paucity of judicial development in this crucial area stems from the 
lacuna of procedural mechanics in the (now non-existent) sentencing phase 
when compared with the judicial development of substantive international 
criminal law and the rich and detailed procedures of the guilt phase.
IV.  THE RETRIBUTIVE MODEL
Retributivism is built around the central premise that the guilty deserve 
to be punished.72 Under this view, the criminal justice system, from the 
police to the courts to the prisons, is designed to ensure that this policy 
goal is achieved. The guilty should be punished and the more guilty 
should be punished even more. There is an a priori good created by such 
punishments that extends beyond any contingent instrumental benefi ts 
that the punishments might have. Although some deterrent or other 
consequentialist eﬀ ects might ensue, the real justifi cation for the project 
comes from the inherent moral worth of punishing those who deserve to 
be punished.73 To do so helps to vindicate the Right over the Wrong (to 
borrow the Germanic phrase).
In particular, punishments for genocide and crimes against humanity 
fit this profile. Genocide in particular is the ultimate crime because 
it involves the destruction not just of one individual but of an entire 
people.74 Those individuals who plan, participate or otherwise organise 
…if these scholarly accounts have had any impact on judges. The impact is diﬃ  cult to measure 
for two reasons. First, judges frequently oﬀ er liĴ le substantive argumentation to justify their 
sentences. Second, judges at the international tribunals rarely cite scholarly materials in their 
judgements, preferring instead to rely on case law, both from the tribunals themselves and, 
where necessary, from war crimes tribunals dating back to World War II.
71 Drumbl argues that retributivism is the main sentencing theory dominating the tribunals at 
this time, though his reasons for this conclusion are unclear. See Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence 
and Individual Punishment’, supra note 54, at 560-61. My reading of the sentencing judgements 
suggests that while Nuremberg was dominated by retributive policies, the current tribunals 
in their practice, as opposed to their rhetoric, are more motivated by concerns of deterrence 
and rehabilitation imported from the domestic penal sphere. This is the only way to explain 
the lower sentences at the ICTY.
72 For an expression of the principle, see G.P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2000 [1978]) 459-63 (linking retribution, desert, and culpability).
73 See ibid., at 462 (maximum level of punishment is set by the degree of wrongdoing).
74 Although academic debates continue about the appropriate list of protected groups under 
the Genocide Convention, the originator of the concept, Raphael Lemkin, envisioned genocide 
as the eradication of a human genos, a national group. See R. Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied 
Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government and Proposals for Redress (Washington, DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944). The moral gravity of the crime stems 
not from the murder of a large number of individuals (covered by war crimes and crimes 
against humanity), but the distinct harm of cultural eradication, thus suggesting that
Continued
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genocidal campaigns are singled out in our justice system for particular 
disapprobation. Such individuals deserve to be severely punished for their 
outrageous conduct, because to do otherwise would be to allow them to 
escape responsibility for their crimes, resulting in impunity – the chief 
enemy of international criminal justice. In the case of genocide, it may not 
maĴ er that neither rehabilitation nor deterrence apply as rationales for 
its punishment. Indeed, if there is any area of the law where retributive 
sentiments are justifi ed, it is in the context of genocide and crimes against 
humanity, where the damage to the moral fabric of society is so severe that 
the international justice system goes to extreme lengths – harnessing the 
powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII of the UN Charter – to 
see that the guilty are punished.75 Such a hĳ acking of the international 
system is warranted not just by instrumental values (seeing that particular 
individuals are rehabilitated), but also by a priori goals, including the 
punishment of the guilty just because those who are guilty of genocide 
deserve to be punished.
There is always a diﬃ  culty in explaining retributive sentiments to those 
who do not share them.76 Indeed, criminal law theorists working within 
the retributive paradigm oĞ en have liĴ le to say to defend their worldview. 
Such conversations invariably return to the foundational statement that the 
guilty deserve their punishment, and that escaping one’s just deserts is a 
moral wrong. Although such statements are posited, there is liĴ le that can 
be oﬀ ered in the way of justifying this worldview to a consequentialist more 
concerned with deterrence or rehabilitation. Nonetheless, it is important 
not to place the burden of such a defence squarely on the shoulders of the 
retributivist. The burden must also fall on the consequentialist to explain 
why punishing the guilty is important in cases of genocide and crimes 
against humanity when the usual consequentialist goals – deterrence and 
rehabilitation – are at best diﬃ  cult to implement and at worst irrelevant. 
Why then punish the genocidaires at all?
One might object that this entire discussion is not an appropriate subject 
maĴ er for international criminal lawyers, who are accustomed to dealing 
with legal doctrine, not abstract moral philosophy underlying the institution 
…those who carry out these crimes deserve special punishment. For a discussion of genos as 
opposed to ethnos as the root of the concept, see W.A. Schabas, Genocide in International Law: 
The Crime of Crimes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 25.
75 For an analysis of this phenomenon, see G.P. Fletcher and J.D. Ohlin, ‘The ICC – Two Courts 
in One,’ (2006) 4 JICJ 428.
76 Cf. W.A. Schabas, ‘Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach,’ 
(1997) 7 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 461, at 502 (‘At best, the retributive 
sentiments of victims and their families, and of the public in general, must be taken into 
account in developing appropriate policies to deal with punishment for gross human rights 
abuses. But their encouragement may have unwanted and unhappy side eﬀ ects, particularly 
where society is concerned with rebuilding and reconciliation. It should not be forgoĴ en 
that many of the most appalling crimes in both the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda were 
commiĴ ed in the name of retribution for past grievances.’).
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of punishment. This may be true, certainly now that international criminal 
justice has fl ourished into an autonomous legal fi eld, complete with 
legal rules that have their own status independent of the preexisting 
moral codes from which they initially derived both their inspiration and 
legitimacy. Now such international legal rules have their own status, with 
an institutional background, complete with professional lawyers trained 
in their interpretation and manipulation through skilled advocacy. This 
objection may be true, and if it is, it indicates an appropriate role for scholars 
of international criminal justice, schooled in the philosophical foundations 
of international criminal justice, in much the same way that domestic 
criminal law is dominated not just by practitioners and scholars but also 
by philosophers of criminal law dedicated to solving such foundational 
puzzles.
This is by far the most important conceptual puzzle for international 
criminal justice. Given that the usual consequentialist rationales for 
punishment do not apply with enough force in cases of genocide and 
crimes against humanity, the choice is either to recognise the uniquely 
retributive goal of these prosecutions or to simply let the criminals go free. 
The laĴ er, of course, is not an option. Within this retributive framework, 
however, more work remains to be done. International criminal law must 
establish a coherent theory of punishment applicable to its context. I will 
oﬀ er in the remaining pages of this section a brief outline of what such 
a theory would look like, though a complete defence cannot be oﬀ ered 
here. The details of the account must be leĞ  as a future research project to 
be given top priority.
When properly understood, punishment in international criminal law is 
at once retributivist and consequentialist, but at two diﬀ erent levels. In 
addition to the basic fact that the guilty deserve to be punished, the victims 
of various confl icts – say the Kurds in Iraq, the Kosovars in Yugoslavia, 
the Tutsi in Rwanda – may feel that the guilty deserve to be punished. I am 
making a distinction here between the actual retributive foundations for 
international criminal justice on the one hand, and the retributive beliefs 
that victim groups may hold. Such groups are usually not concerned either 
with deterrence or with rehabilitation. Their sole concern is to achieve 
justice for the wrongs that were commiĴ ed against their children, their 
parents, or their spouses. In this sense the victims are frequently motivated 
by retributivist sentiments.77
However, if the victims feel as if the perpetrators will not get the punishment 
that they deserve – because they will not be caught, because there are no 
77 Some victims may be infl uenced by deterrence in the sense that they yearn for a politically 
stable security situation and an end to bloodshed. To the extent that they believe that a tribunal 
might positively infl uence such an outcome, they may be inclined to view a tribunal’s work 
through that lens. Although no empirical data is available, I submit that this is the minority 
view among victims.
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tribunals within which to try them, or because the sentences will be too 
low78 – then the victims may decide to engage in self-help measures and 
take maĴ ers into their own hands. This is where the consequentialist 
rationale for international criminal punishment does come into play, but 
it is entirely diﬀ erent from the usual goals as typically understood in 
domestic criminal law. In this sense, the point of international criminal 
tribunals is, in many cases, to convince victims to put down their arms 
and forgo reprisal aĴ acks, and to submit their grievances to the rule of 
law. This dynamic is central to international criminal justice, especially 
since both the creation of the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as binding ICC 
referrals from the Security Council, are based on the Security Council’s 
Chapter VII authority to take measures to restore international peace and 
security. In this manner, then, criminal law intersects with international 
law, insofar as the criminal justice system for individuals is used as a way 
to help promote international peace and collective security.79
However, even with this context of international peace and security, it 
is critically important to remember that at the level of the victims, the 
justifi cation is retributive. International peace and security can only be 
achieved if the victims believe that the inherent retributive goals of the 
criminal process are being fulfi lled. If they lose confi dence in the system, 
the process collapses and the ultimate goals of international security are 
threatened as well, because the warring factions will continue to fi ght. 
This is especially true in cases where a victim group does not have the 
ability to respond with military force at the moment of its slaughter, but 
may postpone reprisals for years – decades even – until their military or 
political strength is greater. It is in this way that past wrongs fester until 
they infect future generations as well.80
It is somewhat ironic, then, that international law must recognise the 
basic, foundational elements of retributivism in the criminal process, if 
the non-retributive goals of public international law are to be achieved. If 
the retributive goals are ignored, victims lose confi dence in the system, the 
guilty are not adequately punished, the moral fabric to the international 
community is not repaired, ethnic confl ict reignites, and the twin goals 
of collective peace and security, as codifi ed in the UN Charter, are not 
respected. This is what I meant when I argued initially that international 
criminal law must develop a unique theory of punishment.
One might object that this account places too much emphasis on the 
demands of the victims. Victims might demand all sorts of remedial 
78 See Combs, ‘International Decisions’, supra note 69, at 936 (victims reacted with ‘predictable 
outrage’ to Plavšić sentence).
79 For a full description of this theory, see J.D. Ohlin, ‘On the Very Idea of Transitional Justice’, 
(2007) 8 Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations 51.
80 See Combs, ‘International Decisions’, supra note 69, at 937 (noting the possibility of biĴ erness 
generated by international criminal trials).
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measures in response to their suﬀ ering, some of which may be warranted, 
but others which may not be warranted. In any event, whether such 
responses are warranted must be established independently, as it were, in 
the sense that it is not because the victims have demanded it that we institute 
such measures. Otherwise the argument would prove too much, because 
anything the victims demand would have to become policy.
This objection misunderstands the structure of the unique theory. At the 
most foundational level, the warrant for punishing international crimes 
is retributivist – the perpetrators deserve to be punished. Switching our 
gaze to the collective level – the world of nation-states, international law, 
and peace and security – helps us to understand the consequences of not 
recognising the true and ineluctable retributive nature of the criminal 
process. At the level of international law, the endeavour of international 
criminal justice is justifi ed by consequentialist commitments. But at the 
level of criminal law, the practice of punishment is justifi ed by retributivist 
commitments. Like a Rorschach test, one can look at diﬀ erent levels when 
one considers international criminal justice and see diﬀ erent things. 
When one evaluates the practice of institutions, one considers the fate of 
collectives and the consequentialist goals of peace and security take centre 
focus, but when one evaluates the sentences of particular individuals, 
then one focuses more tightly on retributive concerns: the oﬀ ender, his 
crime, and the moral gravity of the oﬀ ence. It should be no surprise that 
international criminal law involves a combination of both, depending on 
which level one examines, since the fi eld itself involves the intersection of 
international law and criminal law norms. International criminal justice is 
the intersection of these two fi elds, and its sentencing philosophy ought 
to account for this.
V.  PROCEDURAL CHANGES
Having identifi ed the contours of a unique theory of international criminal 
sentencing – retributive at the individual level, consequentialist at the 
level of international law – it now remains to chart the procedural changes 
required to bring this vision to fruition. Although there may be more, there 
are at least three considerations: (1) the return of a distinct sentencing phase 
aĞ er trial; (2) the creation of a sentencing commission to guide judges in 
exercising their discretion; and (3) the draĞ ing of international sentencing 
guidelines by the commission.  These procedural changes will promote 
the institutional development of a sui generis system of international 
sentencing.
1.  Require a distinct sentencing phase
The most important procedural change required is the establishment 
of a distinct sentencing phase during the trial process. The ICTY fl irted 
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with a separate sentencing phase in its infancy,81 though it abandoned the 
procedure for less than fully articulated reasons.82 For example, Tadić and 
Erdemović were both sentenced in distinct sentencing phases. However, 
the ICTY changed this procedure in 1998 with the amendment of Rules 85 
and 8783 in an eﬀ ort to increase eﬃ  ciency. Scholars have generally assumed 
that the rationale was motivated by a desire to decrease the overall length 
of proceedings and avoid reduplication of evidence and testimony.84 
However, it is uncertain if the elimination of the sentencing phase has been 
successful against this barometer. For example, character witnesses and 
other evidence only relevant to sentencing must now be presented during 
the consolidated trial phase, thus prolonging the time required to return 
a verdict on guilt.85 This suggests that the preferred procedure, even on 
eﬃ  ciency grounds, is bifurcation.86
Scholars have generally noted that the ICC will return to the practice of 
a separate sentencing phase.87 This decision was required, in part, by the 
growing complexity of sentencing under the Rome Statute, which allows for 
victim participation under Rules 89 and 91 and consideration of reparations 
under Rule 94. Furthermore, the factors that determine sentencing under 
Rule 145, including mitigating and aggravating circumstances, are 
substantial, and arguably cannot be eﬃ  ciently evaluated within the same 
81 See ICTY Bulletin No. 12, The Penalties at the ICTY: Determination and Enforcement (‘Unlike 
the Nuremberg trials, where sentences were handed down concurrently with the verdicts, 
the RPE envisage sentencing as a distinct phase. This is particularly indicated by Rule 100’). 
Rule 100 (which remains in eﬀ ect) allows the Prosecutor and Defence, aĞ er conviction on a 
guilty plea, to submit information to the court relevant to sentencing.
82 See Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 734; W.A. Logan, 
‘Confronting Evil: Victims’ Rights in an Age of Terror’, (2008) 96 Georgetown Law Journal 721, 
at 773; S.D. Murphy, ‘Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia’, (1999) 93 American Journal of International Law 57, at 92 (discussing 
ICTY decision to eliminate sentencing phases).
83 See Murphy, ‘Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia’, supra note 82, at 92. Rule 85 (A) (vi) states that evidence at trial shall 
include ‘any relevant information that may assist the Trial Chamber in determining an 
appropriate sentence if the accused is found guilty on one or more of the charges in the 
indictment.’ Rule 87 (C) states that ‘If the Trial Chamber fi nds the accused guilty on one or 
more charges contained in the indictment, it shall impose a sentence in respect of each fi nding 
of guilt and indicate whether such sentences shall be served consecutively or concurrently, 
unless it decides to exercise its power to impose a single sentence refl ecting the totality of 
the criminal conduct of the accused.’
84 See A.N. Keller, ‘Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis of 
Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR’, (2001) 12 Indiana International & Comparative Law Review 53, 
at 68; M.A. Drumbl and K.S. Gallant, ‘Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International 
Criminal Tribunals’, (2003) 15 Federal Sentencing Reporter 140, at 142.
85 On this point, see S. Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2003) 198.
86 Cf. C. Saﬀ erling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2001) 376.
87 See ICC Rule 143. Cf. Logan, ‘Confronting Evil’, supra note 82, at 773 (citing G.A. Knoops, An 
Introduction to the Law of International Criminal Tribunals: A Comparative Study (2003) 117).
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trial proceeding as the guilt phase. However, the exact contours of future 
ICC sentencing procedure are unknown.88
The ICC framework is echoed by substantial scholarly support for the 
bifurcation of sentencing from the guilt phase.89 Scholars have noted 
multiple rationales for bifurcation, but by far the most important is the 
fairness associated with allowing a defendant to oﬀ er mitigating evidence 
– including remorse – without the risk of compromising an assertion of 
innocence.90 In a consolidated proceeding, defendants as a practical maĴ er 
are precluded from expressing remorse for a crime that they claim not 
to have commiĴ ed, for the simple reason that one cannot have personal 
remorse for actions one has not commiĴ ed.91 In a similar vain, defendants 
may wish to call diﬀ erent witnesses during a sentencing phase whose 
testimony might be adverse to their interests during the guilt phase of the 
trial.92 Therefore, consolidated proceedings are not only not justifi ed by 
eﬃ  ciency grounds, they are also supported by a human rights oriented 
approach to criminal procedure.93
There is an intuitive connection between this point and the desire to 
encourage detailed deliberation by the court on sentencing maĴ ers.  If 
litigants are given the opportunity to present arguments specifi cally 
tailored to the question of sentencing, the court will be more likely to 
respond with a decision that not only carefully considers those arguments, 
but also presents a coherent vision and detailed rationale for the handing 
down of a specifi c sentence.94 Ideally, such decisions will be closely tailored 
88 Compare Drumbl and Gallant, ‘Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International 
Criminal Tribunals’, supra note 84, at 142 (‘The Rome State of the ICC, on the other hand, 
appears to favor a separate sentencing hearing’) and Saﬀ erling, Towards an International 
Criminal Procedure, supra note 86, 315 (Article 76 contemplates separate sentencing phase) 
with Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 85, 198 (‘The 
system as defi ned by this amendment has also been adopted as a model for the ICC Statute’ 
and noting that sentencing evidence is presented prior to determination of guilt).
89 See Logan, ‘Confronting Evil’, supra note 82, at 773.
90 Ibid.; R. Henham, Punishment and Process in International Criminal Trials (Aldershot: Ashgate, 
2005) 61. For an example, see Judgement, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, T. Ch. 
II, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 699.
91 This argument was considered and rejected by the ICTY in Judgement, Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, 
Case No. IT-99-36-T, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 1 September 2004, para. 1077-81. See also Judgement, 
Prosecutor v. Vasiljević, Case No. IT-98-32-A, A. Ch., ICTY, 25 February 2004, para. 177 (‘The 
Appeals Chamber is of the view that an accused can express sincere regrets without admiĴ ing 
his participation in a crime, and that that is a factor which may be taken into account.’). The 
Appeals Chamber did not explain how this would be possible. See W.A. Schabas, The UN 
International Criminal Tribunals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006) 429.
92 See Zappalà, Human Rights in International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 85, 198.
93 Ibid., at 198-9 (noting that the human rights view is supported by ICTY Rule 6 which prevents 
trial phase consolidation in cases pending at the time of the amendment so as not to ‘prejudice 
the rights of the accused’). Zappalà correctly concludes that the rule concedes that the change 
reduces the level of procedural protections oﬀ ered to the defense. Ibid., at 199.
94 Logan, ‘Confronting Evil’, supra note 82, at 773, footnote 366. This would point the way 
towards what Sloane refers to as a mature jurisprudence of sentencing. See Sloane, ‘Sentencing 
for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 734.
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to the unique circumstances of international criminal justice, rather than 
simply copied from the domestic sphere.95
Commentators have already noted the degree to which sentencing appears 
to be an aĞ erthought, and that the judges at the ICTY and ICTR do liĴ le 
more than list the permissible aggravating and mitigating circumstances, 
recite the facts of the case, and then impose a length of imprisonment.96 In 
the words of one scholar, there appears to be liĴ le concern with ‘grounding 
the ad hoc tribunals’ sentences, including the prohibition on the death 
penalty, in a coherent moral or philosophical framework.’97
Requiring a distinct sentencing phase would encourage international 
judges to make explicit the legal and factual fi ndings that support their 
decisions, as well as engage in the moral and legal reasoning about 
the defendant’s culpability and the necessary sentence to match that 
culpability.98 These sentencing phases should be conducted in accordance 
with appropriate procedural mechanisms to allow for the new evidence not 
introduced during the guilt phases of the trial, including so-called ‘victim 
impact’ testimony from the prosecution,99 as well as defence evidence of 
mitigating circumstances that aﬀ ect the defendant’s individual culpability. 
Separating such evidence from the guilt phase of the trial will not only 
improve sentencing decisions but will also clarify the goals of the guilt 
phase of the trial and remove evidence from that phase that has no direct 
bearing on the defendant’s guilt or innocence as to the specifi c factual 
allegations against him. Arguably, character witnesses called during the 
guilt phase (whether by the prosecution or defence) will oﬀ er testimony 
that is highly prejudicial as to the defendant’s guilt and furthermore will 
only be probative as to sentencing.
95 Indeed, the Trial Chamber in Delalić started its analysis by referring to Article 33 of the SFRY 
Penal Code. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., Case No. IT-96-21, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 16 
November 1998, para. 1230. The support for this reliance comes from ICTY Statute Article 24 
(1) and has baﬄ  ed some scholars. See Saﬀ erling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, 
supra note 86 at 315. However, this application of Article 24 (1) is perhaps required by the 
principle of legality, such that defendants at the ICTY are not subject to greater penalties 
than they would have endured under preexisting domestic law in Yugoslavia. See Secretary 
General’s Report to the Security Council, S/25074, 3 May 1993; Zappalà, Human Rights in 
International Criminal Proceedings, supra note 85, 196; G. MeĴ raux, International Crimes and the 
Ad Hoc Tribunals (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) 344. One unfortunate consequence 
of this reliance is that it impedes development of a sui generis sentencing jurisprudence.
96 See Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 713.
97 See Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, supra note 39, at 
409.
98 Sentencing phases are also supported by Harman and Gaynor, ‘Ordinary Sentences for 
Extraordinary Crimes’, supra note 2, at 683, who argue for longer sentences at the ICTY. 
However, Harman and Gaynor argue, contrary to my position, that tribunals should give 
greater weight to deterrence. As should already be abundantly clear, a misplaced commitment 
to both deterrence and rehabilitation is the source of the problem – not the solution. The 
only solution is to recognise the true retributive nature of international criminal justice, and 
encourage sentences which adequately represent the moral desert of the oﬀ enders.
99 On the proper role of victims in the criminal process, see G.P. Fletcher, With Justice For Some: 
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2.  An International Sentencing Commission
The second suggested procedural reform is the creation of an International 
Sentencing Commission. Judges currently exercise ad hoc discretion in 
making sentencing determinations, with the result that there is liĴ le 
consistency between sentences at the ICTY. At the ICC, Rule 145 of the Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence calls for the penalty to refl ect ‘the culpability of 
the convicted person’ by balancing all relevant factors, including mitigating 
and aggravating factors, as well as the extent of the damage caused, the 
harm to the victims, the nature of the unlawful behaviour, the means used 
to execute the crime, the degree of participation, as well as other factors. 
Rule 145 also specifi cally mentions that aggravating factors include, inter 
alia, abuse of power, acts of cruelty and acts against multiple victims, 
whether the victims were defenceless, and motives of discrimination. It 
is telling, though, that the provision on fi nes – Rule 146 – is longer than 
Rule 145 on the determination of sentences.
The Rome Statute currently includes a wide variety of procedures 
governing the sentencing of individuals, the transfer of individuals to 
custodial states to serve their term of imprisonment, who shall bear the 
cost, when a sentence can be reviewed (Article 110), how to determine the 
location of the prison sentence, the right of states enforcing a sentence to 
place some restrictions on how the sentence is imposed, but restricting these 
states from reducing or lengthening the sentence. The procedures in this 
regard are already robust and well defi ned, except in the area that is most 
important: what the appropriate penalties should be for particular crimes. 
Every scholar has a basic idea that proportionality is a laudable goal,100 but 
there is nothing in either the Rome Statute itself or the Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence to guide judges in making sentencing determinations for 
crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity.101
An International Sentencing Commission would perform a valuable 
pedagogical function by educating judges and fostering dialogue 
among international criminal lawyers from all sides of the proceedings. 
Independent staﬀ  would conduct both empirical and theoretical research 
regarding international sentencing. Judges would become more aware 
of the unique challenges involved in sentencing for international crimes. 
Moreover, they might genuinely value and trust the counsel they receive 
from independent experts whose analysis is more independent than what 
judges hear in court from defence aĴ orneys and prosecutors. The most 
important goal of this pedagogical process would be to encourage judges 
to consider the sentencing process carefully and produce sophisticated 
Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials (New York: Addison Wesley, 1995).
100 See, e.g., Saﬀ erling, Towards an International Criminal Procedure, supra note 86, 314.
101 See Sloane, ‘Sentencing for the “Crime of Crimes”‘, supra note 6, at 89 (rejecting ‘rigid’ 
guidelines similar to the US federal Sentencing Reform Act but proposing a rational and 
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sentencing decisions that articulate in detail the legal basis for each 
particular sentence handed down.
3.  International sentencing guidelines
An International Sentencing Commission would fi ll this gap by establishing 
general guidelines, in much the same way that the US Sentencing Guidelines 
aid the sentencing process in the federal courts.102 These guidelines were 
once mandatory, but are now advisory aĞ er the US Supreme Court ruled 
that they infringed the basic constitutional right to a jury trial because the 
guidelines relied on factual determinations made by a judge, instead of a 
jury.103 The guidelines created by an International Sentencing Commission 
would take as their starting point the factors identifi ed by Rule 145 of the 
Rules of Procedure, but would render them in greater detail, and include 
specifi c guidelines for each oﬀ ence.104 The rules would not be mandatory, 
but rather persuasive, in that they would establish clearly some basic 
principles to guide sentencing, so that each judge was not working from 
a blank slate.105 For example, commission guidelines could include a 
directive indicating a hierarchy of criminal oﬀ ences, with genocide at 
the top, against which mitigating and aggravating factors would then 
be considered. As it stands now, aggravating and mitigating factors are 
considered, but they are considered against a blank slate, i.e. there is no 
norm against which the aggravating or mitigating factors operate, thus 
rendering the factors somewhat meaningless. Indeed, international courts 
have explicitly refrained from establishing a hierarchy of international 
crimes.106 The creation of sentencing guidelines, and the work of the 
sentencing commission in general, might force international judges to 
fl exible scheme to convey aggravating and mitigating factors).
102 For a discussion generally of the value of sentencing guidelines, see A. von Hirsch et al., 
The Sentencing Commission and its Guidelines (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1987) 
11; J.C. Coﬀ ee, Jr. and M. Tonry, ‘Hard Choices: Critical Trade-Oﬀ s in the Implementation 
of Sentencing Reform through Guidelines’, in M. Tonry and F.E. Zimring (eds.), Reform and 
Punishment, supra note 20, at 155. Compare with M. Tonry, Sentencing MaĴ ers (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 85-89 (discussing shortcomings of guidelines).
103 See United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
104 The suggestion has been made by others as well. See, e.g., A. Dubinsky, Note, ‘An 
Examination of International Sentencing Guidelines and a Proposal for Amendments to 
the International Criminal Court’s Sentencing Structure’, (2007) 33 New England Journal on 
Criminal & Civil Confi nement 609, at 635-6.
105 By making the guidelines optional, they would avoid the problems of infl exibility that 
plagued the US sentencing guidelines. However, they would only be useful insofar as they 
were considered persuasive authority by justices at the court and the degree to which they 
were actually consulted by judges when they rendered their sentencing judgements. There 
is reason to think that judges would both consult and cite them, since there is so liĴ le legal 
guidance that the judges may currently make reference to when explaining their decisions 
about prison terms.
106 See, e.g., Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, T. Ch. I, ICTY, 22 February 
2001, para. 851; Drumbl and Gallant, ‘Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International 
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confront a diﬃ  cult theoretical question that they might otherwise prefer 
to ignore.
4.  Eﬀ ects of the procedural changes
In order for the sentencing procedures of international criminal justice to 
develop fully, a greater sensitivity to questions of proportionality must be 
encouraged. The aforementioned International Sentencing Commission 
is one way of encouraging this goal, in that the guidelines produced by 
the Commission would help ensure consistency across defendants and 
across courtrooms.
However, it is important not to enshrine a fallacious sense of proportionality. 
There is some temptation to use proportionality as an argument for 
leniency.107 Here is how the argument is usually developed. First, one 
defendant receives a life sentence for organising genocide or promoting 
crimes against humanity. Arguably, the fi rst defendant is the worst sort of 
criminal the system will deal with. Then, a second defendant successfully 
argues that he is less culpable than the fi rst defendant, and therefore also 
argues that proportionality requires that he receive a lower sentence.108 
Finally, a third defendant makes the same argument, as do others, with the 
result that many defendants receive sentences that are scaled down – all 
in the name of proportionality, to such a degree that one wonders whether 
the less culpable defendants are receiving appropriate sentences.109
It is important in this regard to distinguish between defendant-relative 
proportionality and oﬀ ence-gravity proportionality.110 The fi rst concept 
Criminal Tribunals’, supra note 84, at 142-3.
107 For example, aĞ er Nuremberg, US High Commissioner John J. McCloy was concerned that 
Krupp’s treatment was out of line with the sentences received by other industrialists, who 
were given light sentences or acquiĴ ed in the Flick trial. This led to a series of commutations 
by McCloy and the Peck Commission.
108 See, e.g., Appellant Hassan Ngeze’s Request for the Appeal Chamber to take Appropriate 
Steps to Rectify the Diﬀ erential and Unequal Treatment Between the ICTR and ICTY in 
Sentencing Policies and Other Rights, Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, 
28 November 2005, para. 22.
109 Judges in the other industrialist trials aĞ er Flick relied on the leniency of these decisions 
as a rationale for extending the lenient treatment, arguing, in part, that stiﬀ  sentences would 
violate proportionality among the various ‘white collar’ defendants. An initial expression 
of leniency against a small group of industrialists gave birth to continuing pressure for 
leniency against all accused industrialists, based largely on the theory that the most culpable 
defendants (the direct perpetrators) ought to receive the severest penalties, while the least 
culpable defendants (those who merely aided or abeĴ ed the genocide) ought to receive lighter 
penalties. In a more recent example, this argument was made by the defence but rejected by 
the ICTR in Decision on Hassan Ngeze’s Motion Requesting to Rectify the Diﬀ erential and 
Unequal Treatment Between the ICTR and ICTY in Sentencing Policies and Other Rights, 
Prosecutor v. Nahimana et al., Case No. ICTR-99-52-A, A. Ch., 23 February 2006.
110 This distinction is analogous to one drawn by A. von Hirsh in ‘Criminology: 
Commensurability and Crime Prevention: Evaluating Formal Sentencing Structures and Their 
Rationale’, (1983) 74 The Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 209, at 212 (defi ning 
Continued
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requires that defendants receive sentences that are proportional to other 
defendants who are more or less culpable, such that the worst defendants 
get the highest sentences and the least culpable defendants get the lowest 
sentences.111 Given that there is a limit to the maximum sentence – life 
in prison – defendant-relative proportionality can only be achieved by 
reducing the sentences of the other defendants.
However, this strategy may pose problems for the second concept, oﬀ ence-
gravity proportionality. This second concept requires that the punishment 
be proportional – i.e. refl ect the gravity of the oﬀ ence – which means that 
even lower-level defendants convicted of serious crimes such as genocide 
may deserve the highest sentences that the system can oﬀ er, i.e. life in 
prison. In these cases, defendant-relative proportionality and oﬀ ence-
gravity proportionality are actually at cross purposes, in that fi delity to 
defendant-relative proportionality may lead a court to lower the sentence 
of a defendant to such a degree that it violates the intuitive directives 
of oﬀ ence-gravity proportionality. As I shall now discuss, this result is 
problematic, especially when considered against the background value 
of ending impunity for international crimes.
When the two senses of proportionality are at cross purposes with each 
other, it requires that we engage in a preliminary ranking of the two, so that 
we can decide which sense of proportionality ought to be maximised, if 
indeed we can only maximise one. I would submit that the retributive aims 
of international criminal justice counsel in favour of prioritising oﬀ ence-
gravity proportionality, because convicted war criminals will only get the 
punishment that they deserve if they are punished according to the gravity 
of the oﬀ ence for which they are convicted. Lowering their sentences in 
order to make it proportional with other, more culpable, defendants only 
runs the risk that the sentence will not adequately refl ect the moral desert of 
the oﬀ ender.112 However, I concede that I cannot oﬀ er a full-blown defence 
of this prioritisation of the two concepts within the confi nes of this chapter. 
The subject will have to be explored in greater depth in another forum. 
However, it is clear that these two aspects of proportionality are in severe 
tension in international criminal justice.
This intuitive dilemma, internal to the notion of proportionality itself, 
is rarely recognised by international judges. It is imperative that future 
…parity, cardinal proportionality and ordinal proportionality as three requirements of desert 
commensurability). See also A. von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment’, 
(1992) 16 Crime & Justice 55, at 75. However, the terms are not without their critics. See, e.g., 
J. Davis, ‘The Science of Sentencing: Measurement Theory and von Hirsch’s New Scales of 
Justice,’ in Tata and HuĴ on (eds.), Sentencing and Society, supra note 9, at 338.
111 Von Hirsch refers to this as ordinal proportionality. See Von Hirsch, ‘Proportionality in 
the Philosophy of Punishment’, supra note 110, at 77.
112 It may not be clear to all that this is the right question. For a defence of desert as the primary 
consideration for the punishment of international crimes, see supra section IV.
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sentencing judges not only appreciate this theoretical tension, but hand 
down sentences that are consistent with an understanding of both senses 
of proportionality. The creation of a sentencing commission, sentencing 
guidelines, and a separate sentencing phase will hopefully encourage 
judges to confront and resolve these issues more directly. Arguably, 
when one sense of proportionality must yield to the other, judges must 
understand that fi rst and foremost, their duty is to hand down sentences 
that adequately refl ect the true gravity of the oﬀ ence charged.113 In this 
sense, the sentencing commission could be of invaluable guidance, 
because it could establish a hierarchy between diﬀ erent oﬀ ences and the 
circumstances that might aggravate and mitigate such conduct,114 while at 
the same time establish sentences that depart from the goal of defendant-
relative proportionality when the case in question requires this result 
(because of the demands of oﬀ ence-gravity proportionality).
One source for the tension between these two senses of proportionality 
stems from the fact that the worst oﬀ enders cannot be executed under 
current guidelines of international criminal justice. As I have argued 
elsewhere, it is an exaggeration to claim that applying the death penalty 
for crimes of genocide violates international law as such.115 Although 
European states have ratifi ed the optional protocols abolishing the death 
penalty in all circumstances, including for grave crimes in times of war 
and emergency, it would be incorrect to say that customary international 
law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty for crimes against 
humanity and genocide.116 Rather, the brief history of international criminal 
justice indicates that many trials, both international and domestic, have 
proceeded under rules that allowed the death penalty, including the 
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, the subsequent US Military 
Trials at Nuremberg, the Far East Tribunal, as well as national courts trying 
Eichmann and Saddam Hussein.117
113 This duty is arguably codifi ed in Rule 145 (1) (a) of the ICC RPE that calls for sentences 
that refl ect ‘the culpability of the convicted person.’ It is interesting to note that the rule does 
not state that punishment cannot exceed the culpability of the oﬀ ender, but rather implies that 
the punishment must equal the culpability of the oﬀ ender, which suggests that the norm may 
be violated by sentences that are too low (in addition to those that are too high). Also, Article 
77 of the Rome Statute allows for life sentences only upon a fi nding that such a sentence is 
required by the ‘extreme gravity of the crime’, though the provision does not require a life 
sentence for any crime.
114 Compare with Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, T. Ch. I, ICTY, 
22 February 2001, para. 851.
115 For a full analysis, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, supra 
note 32, at 747 (arguing that the emerging customary norm prohibiting the death penalty 
does not apply in cases of genocide).
116 See ibid., at 752-53 (discussing insuﬃ  cient state practice for formation of customary 
norm).
117 Some recent national prosecutions for genocidal acts have proceeded without the death 
penalty. See, e.g., Niyonteze v. Public Prosecutor, Trib. militaire de cassation, 27 April 2001, 
available at hĴ p://www.vbs.admin.ch/internet/OA/d/urteile.htm (Swiss court exercising 
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Of course, the parties to the Rome Statute will not amend the rules of the 
court to allow for executions, even for cases dealing with a modern-day 
Hitler, because the penalty contravenes human rights norms that are well-
entrenched in Europe and elsewhere.118 The question of abolition within 
the context of the law of war cannot be separated from the politics and 
human rights discourse associated with abolition in domestic criminal law, 
where outrageous conduct still dominates capital prosecutions in places 
like China and Iran.119 There are at least three distinct consequences of 
international criminal justice’s abolitionism.
First, judges should be sensitive to the problems of proportionality created 
by the lack of the death penalty as an available option at international 
tribunals, and that even the highest sentence – life in prison – may be 
inadequate to represent the moral gravity of some oﬀ ences, especially 
in cases dealing with the highest perpetrators for crimes of genocide 
and crimes against humanity. This is relevant when it comes time to 
sentence lower-rung defendants and to decide whether these defendants 
should receive correspondingly lower punishments.120 In making such 
determinations, judges use the previous sentences for other perpetrators 
as the baseline for making these relative comparisons.121 If, however, the 
sentences for the most culpable perpetrators do not adequately match 
the moral gravity of the oﬀ ence (because human rights standards do 
not allow us to impose such punishments), then perhaps these original 
sentences are inappropriate as starting benchmarks from which to make 
such comparisons.
Second, judges must be aware that the abolitionist structure of international 
criminal justice is not representative of non-European penal systems, 
…universal jurisdiction in case against former mayor accused of ordering massacre of Tutsi 
and moderate Hutu. The case is discussed in Luc Reydams, ‘Case Report: Niyonteze v. Public 
Prosecutor’, (2002) 96 American Journal of International Law 231. Also, the Canadian government 
prosecuted Desire Munyaneza, a Rwandan Hutu living in Canada, for genocide. However, 
examples of national prosecutions for genocide resulting in death sentences include Saddam 
Hussein in Iraq and the Rwandan execution of criminals implicated in the genocide there. 
For a description of the laĴ er, see J.C. McKinley Jr., ‘As Crowds Vent Their Rage, Rwanda 
Publicly Executes 22,’ The New York Times, 25 April 1998, at A1.
118 For a discussion of the political issues in this area, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty 
for Crimes of Genocide’, supra note 32, at 754 (noting that the Security Council’s decision 
to forgo the death penalty for the ICTY and ICTR was motivated, inter alia, by political 
considerations regarding domestic abolitionism).
119 See, e.g., ‘China,’ in Amnesty International, Report 2003, available at hĴ p://web.amnesty.
org/report2003/indexeng (documenting at least 1921 death sentences and 1060 executions 
in 2002, though estimating that the true number may be higher).
120 Cf. Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al., Case No. IT-96-23, T. Ch., ICTY, 22 February 
2001, para. 859 (where the court recognised that the defendant would have been subject to the 
death penalty under the SFRY Criminal Code given the severity of the oﬀ ences). However, 
in other cases the reference has had the opposite eﬀ ect. See Judgement, Prosecutor v. Mrkšić, 
Case No. IT-95-13/1-T, T. Ch. II, ICTY, 27 September 2007, para. 708 (referring to Serbian 
prosecutions in which an appeal reduced an eight-year sentence to two years).
121 See, e.g., Judgement, Prosecutor v. Kvočka et al., Case No. IT-98-30/1, T. Ch., ICTY, 2 November 
2001, para. 732.
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many of which still include the death penalty, especially in some African 
countries, the United States, Russia,122 China, Iran, the Middle East, and 
some Caribbean countries.123 This was of particular concern aĞ er the 
Rwandan genocide, when the Rwandan representative to the United 
Nations, Manzi Bakuramutsa, complained biĴ erly about the lack of the 
death penalty at the proposed ICTR, and on that basis voted against 
the Security Council resolution creating the Tribunal.124 Many of the 
geographical localities where international criminal law is likely to be active 
– war-torn areas of the globe – may be those where the death penalty is 
still an active part of the domestic penal system.125 Insofar as international 
criminal law hopes to be truly international in scope, international courts 
should be cognisant of the fact that, at the moment, sentencing policies do 
not represent the sentencing philosophy of a good portion of the world.126 
In order to maintain consensus, the fi eld has ‘defi ned sentences down’ to 
the lowest common denominator that all participants are comfortable with. 
In situations where the victims come from these non-abolitionist countries, 
judges must remain particularly sensitive to this complex dynamic.
Third, both judges and scholars must pay particular aĴ ention to the 
potentially negative incentives created by the current sentencing policies. 
As has been noted before, defendants tried in domestic courts may face 
penalties, including death sentences, which far outstrip the sentences 
handed down at international tribunals.127 This is especially problematic 
given the tendency in international criminal justice to try the most culpable 
defendants in an international forum, while leaving lower level participants 
for local courts. This creates the unfortunate result that the lowest level 
participants may face the death penalty for their criminal conduct, while 
the worst oﬀ enders, including the architects, may escape this fate if they 
122 Russia is a special case because although it retains death penalty legislation, it has not 
executed anyone since 1996 in accordance with a moratorium on the application of this penalty 
established by Yeltsin to bring Russia into compliance with Council of Europe standards. In 
1999, the Constitutional Court also entered a moratorium on the imposition of this penalty 
until a nationwide jury system could be established. 
123 For a complete list, see Ohlin, ‘Applying the Death Penalty for Crimes of Genocide’, supra 
note 32, at 750-51.
124 See UN Doc. S/PV.3453, at 14-15 (1994) (‘the establishment of so ineﬀ ective an international 
tribunal would only appease the conscience of the international community rather than 
respond to the expectations of the Rwandese people and of the victims of genocide in 
particular’).
125 Rwanda abolished the death penalty in 2007. See Organic Law No. 11/2007 of 16 March 
2007 Concerning Transfer of Cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda and from Other States and Organic Law No 31/2007 of 25 July 2007 
Regarding the Abolition of the Death Penalty.
126 Cf. Alvarez, ‘Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda’, supra note 39, at 
408, footnote 215.
127 For a discussion of this problem, see ibid., at 407 (‘For Rwandan survivors of the 1994 
genocide there is considerable hypocrisy in the United Nations’ insistence that those 
defendants lucky enough to face trial at the ICTR will not face the kinds of penalties, including 
death, imposed under Rwandan law, even if they were the foremost leaders of genocide.’).
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are transferred to Arusha or The Hague. This dynamic, noted before 
by scholars, will get even worse now that the ad hoc tribunals are being 
replaced by a permanent court operating under rules of complementary 
jurisdiction.128
VI.  CONCLUSION
Establishing a coherent theory of international criminal sentencing is of 
more than just philosophical interest. Establishing a coherent account of 
why we punish international war criminals will help determine numerous 
practical areas of international criminal law, several of which have been 
outlined in this essay. There may be more. However, at the least, a coherent 
theory of sentencing will impact not just on the length of sentences and 
how they are determined, but also the manner in which they are served. 
To take just one fi nal example, judges who sentence a criminal before 
the International Criminal Court must decide where the criminal should 
serve his sentence. According to Chapter 12 of the Rules of Procedure and 
Evidence, it is the Presidency that may decide where a defendant is to serve 
his prison sentence. Although there is nothing a priori problematic about 
such discretion, it is important that whichever organ exercises this function 
carefully consider the underlying goals and philosophy of punishment 
when making these determinations.
I have, in this chapter, offered an outline of a coherent theory of 
international criminal punishment. In short, the usual justifications 
for domestic punishment, including rehabilitation and deterrence, are 
inapposite, and international sentencing is based on – or ought to be 
based on – retributive considerations, as embodied in the Rome Statute’s 
plea in its preamble to end impunity for international crimes. Those who 
commit these international crimes ought to be punished simply because 
of the intrinsic moral worth of these prosecutions: the guilty deserve to be 
punished. However, at the level of international law, collective peace and 
security demands that we remain faithful to these retributive goals, because 
failure to punish the guilty adequately will threaten the very confi dence 
in the system that allows victims and other groups to forgo reprisals and 
submit their grievances to the rule of law and the procedures of criminal 
justice – to stay the hand of vengeance, as it were.
The specifi c procedural proposals discussed in this chapter would help 
advance this unique account of international sentencing. Creation of 
an international sentencing commission would garner support from all 
participants in the system, regardless of political viewpoint. A commission 
would create an institution whereby the details of international sentencing 
128 On complementarity, see J.T. Holmes, ‘Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC,’ 
in Cassese et al. (eds.), The Rome Statute Commentary, supra note 56, at 667.
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could be further discussed and codifi ed with greater legal clarity and 
precision. Participation in this commission should be broad-based, 
encompassing every major region (including the United States), include 
the work of a wide number of respected scholars and jurists, and provide 
a framework for meaningful and incisive debate about sentencing, as 
opposed to rehashing the received wisdom on the subject. The goal of 
justice itself demands that we give renewed aĴ ention to this most basic 
and foundational question about international criminal law.
